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LTHOUGH Y2K did not produce the calamities that some had
predicted, it did yield a reasonable harvest of commercial law
cases. This Article summarizes the most important of these
cases, but a caveat must be noted that some may have a short life-span
due to the July 1, 2001 effective date of the revised Uniform Commercial
Code Article 9 that was passed during the 1999 legislative session.' As
usual, this Article follows the organization of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code in its discussion of cases decided during the preceding
year.2
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
The common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction allows the dis-
charge of a disputed monetary obligation by the tender and acceptance of
a check in full satisfaction of a claim even though the amount tendered by
the debtor may be less than the amount demanded by the creditor. 3 As
originally enacted in Texas, Section 1.207 of the Code raised the possibil-
ity that it preempted the common law doctrine and permitted a creditor
* Professor of Law and Foundation Professor of Commercial Law, Texas Tech Uni-
versity. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University.
1. Act of June 18, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 1.01, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2639 (to
be codified as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.101 -.627 (Vernon Supp. 2000)). Several
of the most important changes in the revised Chapter 9 were summarized in the last Survey
and have not been repeated here. See John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 53 SMU L.
REV. 729, 752-60 (2000). More detailed information about the revised Chapter 9 may be
found at http://www.krahmer.net.
2. As presently effective in Texas, the Uniform Commercial Code is contained in the
first eleven chapters of the Texas Business and Commerce Code (the "Code"). See TEX.
Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2000). These chapters are
designated as follows:
Chapter 1: General Provisions
Chapter 2: Sales
Chapter 2A: Leases
Chapter 3: Negotiable Instruments
Chapter 4: Bank Deposits and Collections
Chapter 4A: Funds Transfers
Chapter 5: Letters of Credit
Chapter 7: Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading and Other Documents of Title
Chapter 8: Investment Securities
Chapter 9: Secured Transactions, Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper
3. See, e.g., 2 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: PRACTITIONER'S TREATISE SERIES § 16-15 (4th ed. 1995 & Supp. 2000); 6 ARTHUR
CORBIN, CONTRACTS, §§ 1277-78 (2d ed. 1962).
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to avoid an accord and satisfaction by striking out a debtor's condition of
full payment or by adding such phrases as "Without Prejudice" or "Under
Protest" to the creditor's indorsement.4 Section 1.207 was amended in
1995 by adding an additional subsection stating that "[slubsection (a) [re-
garding reservation of rights] does not apply to an accord and satisfac-
tion."' 5 In Metromarketing Services, Inc. v. HTT Headwear, Ltd.,6 the
court treated the section 1.207 amendment as indicative of a legislative
intent to endorse the rule applied in the majority of earlier Texas cases
that section 1.207 did not preempt the common law doctrine of accord
and satisfaction. 7 The court reasoned, therefore, that an attempt by a
creditor to treat a check as a partial payment in the face of a debtor's
notation that a check was intended as full payment would be ineffective. 8
On the facts before the court, however, an issue still remained as to
whether the full payment condition stated by the debtor on the check in
question applied only to three specific invoices listed on the check or to
twenty-three other invoices as well. The court held that this issue of ma-
terial fact precluded summary judgment in favor of the debtor, and the
case was remanded.9
In Indiana Lumberman's Mutual Ins. Co. v. State of Texas,10 the court
also held that the Code did not preempt the common law doctrine of
accord and satisfaction, but based its decision on earlier Texas cases with-
out discussing the amendment to section 1.207.11 Unfortunately, neither
case involved application or interpretation of the 1995 revision of Chap-
ter 3 of the Code that, for the first time, included a comprehensive section
dealing with accord and satisfaction by use of a negotiable instrument. 12
4. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.207 (Vernon 1994). Compare Pileco, Inc. v.
HCI, Inc., 735 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding
that accord and satisfaction barred recovery when plaintiff negotiated full payment check
after adding protest language to plaintiff's indorsement) with Robinson v. Garcia, 804
S.W.2d 238, 247 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991), writ denied per curiam, 817 S.W.2d 59
(Tex. 1991) (holding that no accord and satisfaction resulted by cashing check tendered in
full satisfaction where exception to full payment condition in restrictive indorsement was
noted on the check).
5. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.207(b) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
6. 15 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
7. See id. at 198. The earlier cases noted by the court included Pileco, Inc. v. HCI,
Inc., 735 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (cashing
check was accord and satisfaction despite protest language added by creditor); Hixson v.
Cox, 633 S.W.2d 330, 331 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (striking of restrictive
indorsement and inserting notation that check was accepting as partial payment did not
avoid accord and satisfaction when check was cashed), and Roylex, Inc. v. S & B. Eng'rs,
Inc., 592 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ) (holding that creditor
could not avoid accord and satisfaction by attempting to vary the conditions upon which
check is tendered for payment).
8. See 15 S.W.3d 190.
9. See id.
10. 1 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
11. The cases cited by the court are included in note 7, supra.
12. Chapter 3 was extensively revised by the Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch.
921, §§ 1-2, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4582 (Vernon). TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.311 (Vernon Supp. 2001) now deals at some length with the subject of accord and satis-
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B. COURSE OF DEALING AND USAGE OF TRADE
Section 1.205 of the Code permits course of dealing and trade usage to
aid in the interpretation of a contract. 13 A course of dealing is a sequence
of previous conduct between the parties under similar contracts that casts
light on their understanding of the meaning of their contractual relation-
ship. 14 Usage of trade refers to how other parties, engaged in the same
trade or business interpret and apply terms used in contracts like those
involved in the contract in question. 15 Both course of dealing and usage
of trade can be excluded or superseded by the express terms of an
agreement. 16
Even in the absence of a clause excluding course of dealing and usage
of trade, however, such evidence is not admissible if the contract is unam-
biguous. Thus, in Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Texaco, Inc.,17
the court of appeals held it was error for the trial court to have admitted
evidence of trade usage when there was no ambiguity in the contract.
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. WHEN A SALE OCCURS
In Lee v. The Bank,'8 the court held that the buyer of an automobile
under a certified copy of a certificate of title did not acquire good title to
the automobile when a prior lien on the vehicle had been released by
virtue of a forgery made by a prior owner. The court noted that a registra-
tion act, such as the Certificate of Title Act, does not protect a buyer "if
any link in the chain of title has been forged."' 19 In another certificate of
title case, the court held that, in the event of conflict between the Certifi-
cate of Title Act and the Business and Commerce Code, the provisions of
faction when a "Payment in Full" condition is stated on a check or other negotiable instru-
ment. The effect of this section has not yet been the subject of a reported case in Texas.
13. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.205 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
14. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.205(a) (Vernon 1994) provides:
A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to
a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a com-
mon basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other
conduct.
15. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.205(b) (Vernon 1994) provides, in part:
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity
of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it
will be observed with respect to the transaction in question ....
16. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.205(d) (Vernon 1994) which provides:
The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing or
usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with
each other; but when such construction is unreasonable express terms control
both course of dealing and usage of trade and course of dealing controls us-
age of trade.
17. 35 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], 2000, no pet. h.).
18. 23 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet. h.).
19. Id. at 131. The Texas Certificate of Title Act is contained in TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. §§ 501.001-.035 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2000).
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the Business and Commerce Code govern.20
B. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In Malone v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,2 1 a buyer and seller did
not reduce their contract of sale to writing. In an action by the buyer
against the seller for breach of contract, the court held that summary
judgment in favor of the seller was proper because the contract was not in
writing and it did not satisfy any of the exceptions to the section 2.201
statute of frauds.22 The court also held that a Deceptive Trade Practices
Act (DTPA) claim asserted by the buyer was barred because the alleged
failure of the seller to sell as much paint as the buyer wanted to buy was
not based on a defect in the goods but was a mere complaint about the
quantity the buyer wanted to purchase.23 As such, the buyer was not a
"consumer" for DTPA purposes since the goods themselves did not form
the basis of the complaint. 24
C. WARRANTIES
Buyers have four basic theories of warranty recovery available to them
under the Code in contracts for the sale of goods: (1) breach of a war-
ranty of title;25 (2) breach of an express warranty;26 (3) breach of an im-
plied warranty of merchantability; 27 and (4) breach of an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.28 Claims for breach of war-
ranty may also overlap claims based on strict liability, negligence, or de-
ceptive trade practices act violations. 29 Regardless of any overlap,
however, a fundamental element of any of these claims is that some form
of legally cognizable damage results.
20. See Hudson Buick, Pontiac, GMC Truck Co. v. Gooch, 7 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1999, pet. denied); see also TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.005 (Vernon 1999).
21. 8 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
22. See id. at 714-15. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (Vernon 1994) requires
that a contract for the sale of goods in an amount greater than $500.00 be in writing or that
the party against whom enforcement is sought: (1) be a merchant who has not objected to a
writing in confirmation of the contract sent by the other party; or (2) has ordered goods
that are to be specially manufactured and are not suitable for sale to others; or (3) has
admitted in pleadings, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract exists; or (4) has
made a partial payment or has partially performed the contract.
23. 8 S.W.3d at 715. The Deceptive Trade Practices Act appears as TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 -.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 2000).
24. 8 S.W.3d at 715. Under TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp.
2000), a "consumer" must seek or acquire goods by purchase or lease and the goods must
form the basis of the complaint. The requirement that the goods form the basis of the
complaint has been long-standing under the DTPA. See Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett,
Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1987) (op. on reh'g).
25. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312 (Vernon 1994).
26. See id. at § 2.314.
27. See id. at § 2.315.
28. See id. at § 2.315.
29. Some examples of such overlapping claims are discussed in John Krahmer, Com-




In Coghlan v. Aquasport Marine Corp.,30 the plaintiffs purchased a
boat from the defendant seller which was represented to be made entirely
of fiberglass. In fact, the boat deck was constructed of one and one-half
inches of plywood encased in fiberglass. The plaintiffs sued under the fed-
eral Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act for breach of a written warranty and
for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose as
well as for various forms of fraud and misrepresentation. 31 The court
held that regardless of the theory on which the suit was based, the plain-
tiffs were required to plead some "concrete and palpable" injury beyond
a mere allegation that it was possible that the fiberglass coated wood
might rot or that the resale value of the boat might be diminished. 32 Not-
ing that precedent required damages to be "actual and palpable in order
to be legally cognizable," the court dismissed the complaint without
prejudice because the damages alleged in the complaint were purely hy-
pothetical. 33 On the claim for breach of the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, the court further noted that the plaintiffs had not
alleged a particular purpose for which the boat was to be used but had
only alleged that it would be used for its ordinary purpose as a fishing
boat.34 Because of the failure to allege a particular purpose, which was
the stated basis for invoking the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the war-
ranty claims were dismissed on this ground as well.35
Although the requirements of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act were
not met in Coghlan, the plaintiffs in In re Van Blarcum36 used Magnuson-
Moss successfully to challenge a trial court order for arbitration of a
breach of warranty claim based on alleged defects in a mobile home. In
Van Blarcum, the plaintiff consumers purchased a mobile home under a
retail installment contract that provided that all disputes arising out of the
purchase of the mobile home were to be resolved by arbitration under
the Federal Arbitration Act. 37 The contract also stated that its provisions
would inure to the benefit of the seller, the manufacturer, and any lender
that financed the purchase of the mobile home.38 After numerous com-
plaints about defects in the construction of the mobile home went un-
heeded, the Van Blarcums sued all three of these parties both for breach
of express written warranties and for breach of implied warranties. The
defendants moved to compel arbitration and their motion was granted. 39
The Van Blarcums then sought mandamus relief to reverse the order of
the trial court and to permit them to proceed with their state court
30. 73 F.Supp.2d 769 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
31. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is a federal law establishing standards for writ-
ten warranties in the sale of consumer goods. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301 -12 (2000).
32. Coghlan v. Aquasport, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 772.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 774-75.
35. See id. at 775.
36. 19 S.W.3d 484 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).






In what the court characterized as an issue of first impression in Texas,
the Van Blarcums argued that a warrantor of consumer goods under
Magnuson-Moss is prohibited from using a contract clause in a contract
signed at the time of purchase to require binding arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism for warranty claims.41 After a careful review of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Federal Trade Commission rules, guides,
and interpretations of the act, and the limited number of prior cases in-
volving the issue, the court concluded that Magnuson-Moss did, indeed,
override the Federal Arbitration Act in regard to both express warranty
claims and implied warranty claims and rendered sales contract clauses
requiring arbitration of such claims invalid and unenforceable. 42 A dis-
senting opinion agreed that Magnuson-Moss prohibited the use of arbi-
tration for written warranty claims but did not prohibit arbitration of
implied warranty claims.43
Whether Van Blarcum will be followed by other Texas courts remains
to be seen. However, with the increased use of arbitration as a way to
resolve warranty disputes in recent years, this is a case of some impor-
tance because of its perspective on the relationship between arbitration
and litigation on the subject of consumer product warranties under
Magnuson-Moss. 44
Arbitration also figured in the case of Edwards v. Schuh,45 but in the
context of commercial litigation, where the court denied arbitration be-
tween the builder of three warehouses and the subsequent purchasers of
the warehouses on the ground that the only arbitration clause appeared
in the original construction contract and the subsequent purchasers were
40. See id. at 489.
41. See id. at 487.
42. See id. at 496. The Federal Trade Commission rules, guides, and interpretations are
collected in "Final Action Concerning Review of Interpretations of Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act; Rule Governing Disclosure of Written Terms and Conditions; Rule Governing
Disclosure of Written Consumer Product Warranty Terms and Conditions; Rule Governing
Pre-Sale Availability of Written Warranty Terms; Rule Governing Informal Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures; and Guide For the Advertising of Warranties and Guarantees," 64 Fed.
Reg. 19700 (1999). The principal case on which the court relied was Southern Energy
Homes, Inc. v. Lee, 732 So.2d 994 (Ala. 1999).
43. See Van Blarcum, 19 S.W.3d at 498.
44. The reader may find it an interesting legal process exercise to compare the deci-
sion in In re Conseco Finance Servicing Corp., 19 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no
pet.) with the decision in Van Blarcum. Conseco was decided almost exactly one month
before Van Blarcum, but the decision addressed, inter alia, the question of whether an
arbitration clause in a contract for the sale of a manufactured home was unconscionable
and, therefore, unenforceable where the consumer plaintiffs sought to avoid arbitration in
a case where they had defaulted on their loan payments. Relying on general public policy
favoring arbitration, and feeling itself bound by the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in
In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1999), the court held that arbi-
tration could be compelled. The next few years may well produce an interesting collection
of cases on the relationship between warranties, arbitration, and public policy that is just as
complex as that currently existing in the intersection between warranties, strict liability,
negligence, and the DTPA.
45. 5 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.).
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not parties to that contract. The only document received by the subse-
quent purchasers from the builder contained an express warranty regard-
ing the buildings and did not contain an arbitration clause. The court,
therefore, held that arbitration could not be compelled when the purchas-
ers were not signatories to the arbitration agreement. 46
In Helena Chemical Co. v. Wilkins,47 three farmers asserted breach of
warranty and DTPA claims for the failure of cotton seed to produce the
expected yields. An issue of first impression was whether the suit was
barred because the farmers had delayed in submitting their claims to arbi-
tration as required by the Texas Agricultural Code.48 On this issue, the
court held that mere delay in submitting their claims, as contrasted to a
failure to submit the claims at all, did not bar the farmers' suit.49 As to
the merits of the warranty and DTPA claims, the court held that disclaim-
ers of implied warranties that were stated on the seed bag, on the
purchase ticket, and on the invoices were effective for the seller to avoid
liability on the breach of warranty theory.50 The court also held, however,
that the disclaimers were not effective to avoid liability on the grounds of
misrepresentation and unconscionability asserted as independent causes
of action under the DTPA.51 Similarly, the court held that an attempted
limitation of liability was effective only as to the warranty claims and not
as to the DTPA claims.52
In Buecher v. Centex Homes,53 a group of homeowners brought a class
action to enjoin a builder from enforcing a waiver of the warranties of
habitability and good workmanship contained in the contracts by which
they had purchased their homes.54 The question before the court was
whether the holding in Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes55 that a war-
ranty of good workmanship could not be waived or disclaimed extended
to the warranty of habitability that had been adopted in Humber v. Mor-
ton.56 The resolution of this issue hinged on the interpretation of a some-
what cryptic sentence in the Melody Home opinion where the court
stated, "To the extent it conflicts with this opinion, we overrule G-W-L,
46. See id. at 833.
47. 18 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. granted).
48. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 64.002 (Vernon 1995) requires a purchaser to submit
seed claims to arbitration as a prerequisite to maintaining legal action. Although the arbi-
tration is non-binding, submission to arbitration is required. See Helena Chemical, 18
S.W.3d at 750-51.
49. See Helena Chemical, 18 S.W.3d at 751-52.
50. See id. at 757.
51. See id. at 757-58.
52. See id.
53. 18 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. granted).
54. The warranty of habitability was adopted as a common law warranty applicable to
the sale of homes in Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Tex. 1968). The warranty of
good workmanship was adopted several years later in Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes,
741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
55. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
56. 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
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Inc. v. Robichaux.' '57 In G-W-L the court held that disclaimers of the
warranty of habitability would be effective so long as they were "clear
and free from doubt."'58 The interpretive difficulty, of course, was to de-
termine the extent to which G-W-L had been overruled, an issue that was
noted several years ago in an earlier Survey and that has only now
reached a court of appeals. 59
The court reasoned that the rationale for prohibiting the disclaimer of
the implied warranty of good workmanship adopted in Melody applied
with equal force to the warranty of habitability in the construction of new
homes.60 As a matter of public policy, therefore, the court held that the
attempted disclaimer was unenforceable. 6' A concurring opinion agreed
that the majority had correctly pieced together the Humber, Melody
Home, and G-W-L puzzle, but expressed the view that Melody Home
should be reconsidered by the Supreme Court.62 A dissenting opinion
argued that G-W-L survived Melody Home because the anti-waiver hold-
ing in Melody Home was addressed only to a warranty of good workman-
ship in the repair of tangible property and not to the sale of new homes.
63
A petition for review has been granted in Buecher. If an opinion is
eventually forthcoming, it may be of considerable importance in clarify-
ing the matter of how and when the common law warranties of habitabil-
ity and good workmanship can be disclaimed or if they can be disclaimed
at all.
The issue of federal preemption of state law warranty claims was raised
in Cole v. Central Valley Chemicals, Inc.,64 where several farmers sued a
seller of herbicides for DTPA violations and for negligent misrepresenta-
tion. The court held that these claims were not preempted by the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act.65 This act preempts common
law tort claims relating directly or indirectly to labeling. In the case at
bar, however, the claims were based on oral representations made by the
seller's sales representative, and the court held that these claims were not
preempted. 66 The court also held that sufficient evidence had been ad-
duced by the farmers to show that the misrepresentations were both a
producing cause and a proximate cause of the lower crop yields they suf-
fered after application of the herbicide. 67 The defendants also argued that
the claim for alleged misrepresentations was excluded from the DTPA as
57. Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 355 (referring to G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643
S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982)).
58. G-W-L, 643 S.W.2d at 393.
59. See John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 42 Sw. L.J. 217, 224 at n. 48 (1988).
60. See Buecher, 18 S.W.3d at 811.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 812.
63. See id. at 813.
64. 9 S.W.3d 207 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
65. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136 et seq. (1980).
66. See 9 S.W.3d at 210.
67. See id. at 211-12.
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a professional service.68 There was no case law construing this portion of
the DTPA, and the court concluded that the farmers' claims were based,
not on the purchase of a professional service, but on the purchase of
goods and were, therefore, actionable under the DTPA.69
Breach of an express warranty of title can be the basis for both a
breach of warranty claim and a Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim for
misrepresentation. In Munawar v. Cadle Co.,70 the court held that both
claims would lie for breach of an express warranty of title covering real
and personal property and that neither the doctrine of merger by deed
nor the parol evidence rule would exclude proof of the seller's represen-
tations regarding the transfer of good title to the property.
In Perry v. Breland,71 the court held that contractual privity is not re-
quired in an action for breach of a warranty of good title against a remote
vendor. The court also suggested in dicta that a warranty of good title is
not breached if the seller transfers a voidable title, but it qualified this
statement by pointing out that it had only a limited record before it and
that this issue should be addressed on remand.72
D. BREACH AND DAMAGES
In Cook Composites, Inc. v. Westlake Styrene Corp. ,73 a buyer failed to
provide written evidence of a competitor's price sufficient to invoke a
"meeting competition" clause in a contract. Despite failing to produce
68. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000) provides in part:
(c) Nothing in this subchapter shall apply to a claim for damages based on
the rendering of a professional service, the essence of which is the providing
of advice, judgment, opinion, or similar professional skill. This exemption
does not apply to: (1) an express misrepresentation of a material fact that
cannot be characterized as advice, judgment, or opinion ....
69. See Cole v. Central Valley Chems., 9 S.W.2d at 210. The court explained its reason-
ing as follows:
The Coles assert that they did not go to CVC to pay for or receive profes-
sional services, but rather to buy a herbicide. The Coles argue that constru-
ing [the salesperson's] recommendation as a professional service would
abolish the DTPA whenever a consumer purchased a product based on the
advice of the salesman. In this case, we find that the Coles's claim is not
based on the rendering of a professional service but, rather on the purchase
of Surpass 100. Thus, section 17.49 of the DTPA does not preclude the
Coles's claim and CVC failed to establish as a matter of law that it is entitled
to summary judgment on its affirmative defense of exclusion.
70. 2 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
71. 16 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied).
72. See id. at 191. While the suggestion is only dicta, it is a somewhat unfortunate
statement since prior Texas cases have held that a breach of the warranty of good title
occurs if there is a disturbance of the buyer's right to quiet possession, even if the buyer
ultimately prevails in litigation with the person who claims title. See, e.g., Saenz Motors v.
Big H. Auto Auction, Inc., 653 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983), affd, 665
S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1984) (disturbance of quiet possession sufficient to breach warranty of
title); Trial v. McCoy, 553 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1977), appeal after remand,
581 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979) (warranty of title breached when gun was
seized by police on information that it was stolen property; no requirement that buyer
prove that gun was actually stolen).
73. 15 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. dismissed).
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such evidence, the buyer contended that it had reasonable grounds for
insecurity and was justified in treating the seller's refusal to reduce its
price as an anticipatory repudiation. The court held that the buyer had no
reasonable grounds for insecurity and no grounds to request adequate
assurance of performance under section 2.609 of the Code.74 Instead, the
court ruled that the buyer itself was in breach for refusing to accept fur-
ther deliveries of goods under the contract. 75 As to the seller's damages,
the court found that although the seller did not qualify for the recovery of
resale damages because of a failure to plead that it had met the require-
ments of notice and commercial reasonableness under section 2.706, the
seller was entitled to recover damages under the general contract/market
price formula stated in section 2.708.76
In Elias v. Mr. Yamaha, Inc.,77 a buyer made a down-payment for the
purchase of a jet ski, partly in cash and partly by trading in an old jet ski.
The dealer sold the jet ski taken in trade and failed to deliver the new jet
ski. In an action against the dealer for breach of contract, DTPA viola-
tions, fraud, and conversion, the court held that the buyer was entitled to
recover for the failure to deliver the new jet ski and for loss of use for ten
days during which the new jet ski could be used. 78
E. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Pecan Valley Nut Co., Inc. v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.,7 9 the
court held that breach of warranty claims were barred by the four year
limitations period in section 2.725 of the Code, but that the discovery rule
in section 17.565 of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act tolled the two year
limitations period applicable to the DTPA claims.80 The difference in
treatment of the two limitations periods is due to the lack of a discovery
rule in section 2.725, which starts the limitations period upon tender of
delivery, whether or not a defect has been discovered at that time. Under
section 17.565 in the DTPA, a cause of action arises when the plaintiff
knows or should have known that a wrongful injury has occurred. As
illustrated by this case, this disparity can sometimes cause a seemingly
anomalous result in which the longer limitations period expires before
the shorter limitations period has run.
74. See id. at 140 (discussing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.609 (Vernon 1994)).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 137-39 (discussing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.706 & .708
(Vernon 1994)).
77. 33 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.).
78. See id. at 62.
79. 15 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. filed).
80. See id. at 247-49 (discussing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Vernon 1994)




A. TRANSFER OF INSTRUMENTS AND LIMITATIONS ON ACTIONS
The transfer of a negotiable instrument may be the most common area
in which actual behavior deviates most markedly from legal theory. The
theory is very simple: if an instrument specifies a payee, that payee, and
that payee alone, is entitled to indorse the instrument for purposes of
transfer.81 Some additional rules are applicable to determine the person
who must indorse an instrument following its initial transfer.82 In real life,
however, indorsements may vary slightly from the name specified on an
instrument (e.g., a check payable to "Acme Corp." might be deposited
under the stamped indorsement of "Acme Corporation"), or vary more
seriously (e.g., a note payable to "John Paul Jones" might be indorsed
simply as "John Jones"), or the indorsement might be missing in its en-
tirety. Although the Code tries to make allowances for the human predi-
lection to use abbreviations, shorthand phrases, misspellings, and even
omissions, the transfer of an instrument that varies in any way from the
requirements of legal theory can lead to problems when money is at
stake. This point is nicely illustrated in the cases of Boyd v. Diversified
Fin. Systems 83 and Bosque Asset Corp. v. Greenberg.84
In Boyd, the court held that a note acquired by the FDIC in its receiv-
ership capacity could be indorsed by the FDIC in its corporate capacity
without affecting the validity of the indorsement. The court further held
that a "Loan Sale Agreement" between FDIC-Corporate and a private
loan buyer was effective to transfer an associated guaranty of the note to
the buyer and to permit the buyer, as a holder in due course, to recover
against a guarantor. In addition, the court held that a waiver contained in
the guaranty agreement effectively waived the defense of impairment of
collateral whether or not the note buyer qualified as a holder in due
course.
In Bosque, the court considered two matters regarding the transfer of
instruments. First, was there sufficient evidence to show that the assignee
was the owner or holder of the note in question when there were two
apparent breaks in the chain of transfer?
On this issue, the court held that a Declaration of Insolvency by the
Comptroller of the Currency was a self-authenticating record sufficient to
show that the bank named as payee on the note and the bank that was
declared insolvent by the FDIC were the same entities despite a slight
difference in name. 85 The court further held that no indorsement by
FDIC-Receiver was required to transfer the note to FDIC-Corporate.8 6
81. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.204 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
82. See id. at § 3.205.
83. 1 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
84. 19 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied).
85. See Bosque Asset, 19 S.W.3d at 518. The named payee was "First National Bank;"
the entity declared insolvent was "First National Bank of Garland."
86. See id. at 519.
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Thus, there were no actual breaks in the chain of transfer prior to acquisi-
tion of the note by the assignee.
Second, the plaintiff-assignee had not acquired the note directly from
the FDIC. Instead, plaintiff acquired the note from a prior assignee who
had purchased the note from the FDIC and filed an action on it against
the defendant maker within the six-year limitations period allowed to
such assignees. After purchasing the note, the subsequent assignee inter-
vened in this action more than six years after the due date. The court held
that the benefit of the six-year limitation period ran to subsequent assign-
ees as well as to the first assignee from the FDIC, and that a late interven-
tion was not barred where the intervenor was merely suing on the same
note that was in issue when the original petition was filed.87
To some extent, the issue of whether the state or federal limitations
period applies to negotiable notes has disappeared following the 1995 re-
vision of Chapter 3 of the Code. 88 During any transition period, however,
there is always the problem of relating old time periods to new time peri-
ods. Addressing this issue, Whittle v. MCorp Properties9 held that if a
shorter limitations period has not fully run on the date that a longer limi-
tations period becomes effective, the longer limitations period will apply
because there is no vested right in a limitations period until it has actually
expired. 90 In Whittle the defendant maker of a note sought to use the
four-year limitations period to bar an action against him for unpaid in-
stallments due more than four years but less than six years after the 1995
revisions became effective. As noted by the court, the limitation bar be-
gan running when the maker failed to make his payments, but the limita-
tions defense had not vested when the revised Chapter 3 became
effective. 91 Because the defense of limitations had not matured when suit
was brought, the suit was timely when it was filed within the new six-year
limitations period. 92
As a counter-point to the decision in Whittle, however, it must be noted
that the six-year limitations period is only applicable to suits on a promis-
sory note and not to suits on underlying contracts which are still governed
by a four-year limitations period. Thus, in Rampart Capital Corp. v.
Egmont Corp.,93 the court held that claims based on breach of contract
and breach of a fiduciary duty were governed by a four-year limitations
period rather than the six-year limitations period for claims based on a
87. See id. at 520-22.
88. Prior to the revision, a two-year limitation period under state law applied to nego-
tiable notes. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 16.003 -.004 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
However, this time period conflicted with the six-year limitation period permitted under
federal law by 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(14) (West 1989 & Pamph. Supp. 1999). As revised,
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118 (Vernon Supp. 2000) now provides the same six-
year limitations period for negotiable notes as provided by federal law.
89. 17 S.W.3d 718 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).
90. See id. at 721.
91. See id.
92. See id.





The surety in an agreement between a land development company and
a lending institution offered a $200,000 Certificate of Deposit as collateral
on a $865,000 loan. In the course of filling out the papers a clerical error
was discovered, changed, and initialed by the land developers and the
lending institution. Notification of the change was not given to the surety.
The error was made in the maturity date of the Certificate of Deposit,
changing it from two years, as printed, to the one year that was intended.
After the land developers defaulted, the bank foreclosed on the $200,000
Certificate of Deposit and credited that amount toward the unpaid bal-
ance of the loan.
In Frost Nat'l Bank v. Burge,95 the court agreed with the bank that no
material alteration had taken place. The surety argued that changing the
maturity from two years to one year would discharge his obligation. The
court found, through a review of other documents executed at the same
time, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction,
that the intent of the parties was for a one year maturity, not two years.
This finding that no material alteration occurred also defeated the
surety's conversion claim.
C. LIABILITY OF CO-MAKERS, ACCOMMODATION PARTIES,
AND GUARANTORS
In Caprock Inv. Corp. v. FDIC,96 a group of borrowers, including a
corporation, executed a promissory note in favor of a bank to purchase
mineral leases. When the borrowers defaulted, the bank commenced
foreclosure proceedings. Subsequently, one of the borrowers filed for
bankruptcy protection. The action against this borrower was severed from
the state proceedings.
Two years later the bank failed and all of its assets were transferred to
the FDIC as receiver. Three years after the bank failure, the corporate
borrower filed a counterclaim in the state action and one of the individual
borrowers intervened. In the meantime, the FDIC sold the note to an
investment company. The investment company sought to intervene and
substitute itself for the bank. It also filed an amended petition suing the
corporation and the remaining borrowers individually. The corporation
and the borrowers objected to the intervention. The trial court denied the
investment company's motion to intervene and granted summary judg-
ment for the borrowers.
94. Breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims are governed by TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.004 (Vernon Supp. 2000) instead of by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 3.118 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
95. 29 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000).
96. 17 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied).
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On appeal, the court held that the investment company had a right to
intervene because it could have brought the same action in its own
name.97 The borrowers argued that because the investment company
never produced a schedule of assets described in the contract of sale be-
tween the FDIC and the investment company, it could not prove that it
was the owner of the note and, therefore, it had no right to intervene. The
court disagreed and held that proof of "transfer of a note may be proved
by testimony as well as by documentation. '98 In the case at bar, the court
ruled that testimony introduced on behalf of the investment company was
sufficient to prove a transfer of the note and that the failure to produce
the asset schedule was not fatal to its ability to prove that it owned the
note.99
The makers also argued that the discharge in bankruptcy of the non-
party co-maker satisfied their obligations on the note as a matter of law.
The court again disagreed, stating that although the bankruptcy court's
confirmation of a plan binds a debtor and all creditors as to that debtor, a
discharge in bankruptcy does not alter the rights of a creditor to collect
from third parties. 100 The court stated that it was "clear from the lan-
guage and history of section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code that the dis-
charge of a debtor's obligation by operation of the Bankruptcy Code does
not discharge or affect in any way a co-maker's liability on his
obligation." 10 1
In The Cadle Co. v. Regency Homes, Inc.,102 the holder of a variable
rate note issued to a failed bank, and subsequently sold by the FDIC to
the holder, sued a guarantor who had signed an unlimited guaranty cov-
ering all debts of the maker owed to the bank. In a careful analysis of
prior caselaw regarding variable rate notes indexed to the prime rate of
failed banks, the court held that the holder of a variable rate note is enti-
tled to introduce evidence of a reasonable rate of interest in lieu of the
ability to ascertain the prime rate of a defunct bank.10 3
The guarantor attempted to avoid liability on the guaranty by arguing
that the note had already been paid in full, but the court found that there
was a failure of proof on this issue. 10 4 The guarantor also argued that the
disposition of collateral securing the note had been commercially unrea-
sonable. However, because the note holder was suing only on the note
itself and not for recovery of a deficiency judgment, the court held that
the rule barring recovery of a deficiency in the case of a commercially
unreasonable disposition of collateral did not apply.10 5
97. See id. at 710.
98. Id. at 711.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 712.
101. Id. at 712 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(e) (West 1993)).
102. 21 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).
103. See id. at 678-80.
104. See id. at 678.
105. See id. at 680-81. The rule barring recovery of a deficiency judgment following the
commercially unreasonable disposition of collateral (generally termed the "absolute bar"
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In Taylor-Made Hose, Inc. v. Wilkerson,1°6 on a rehearing en banc, by a
four to three majority, the court withdrew a prior panel decision and is-
sued a new opinion. The new opinion held that the Vice President of a
corporation who had signed a credit application on behalf of the corpora-
tion was personally liable as a guarantor of the corporate debt. A clause
in the credit application stated that the signer "personally agree[d] to pay
all invoices and cost of collection on any amount remaining unpaid after
90 days."'01 7 The court ruled that, as a matter of law, this clause unam-
biguously made the signer a guarantor who was personally liable for the
corporation's debt.'0 8 A strong dissenting opinion by three of the seven
judges argued that the clause was, indeed, ambiguous and that the major-
ity had changed the Texas law favoring obligors on guaranty agreements
to a rule favoring obligees. 0 9
VI. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. SCOPE OF FUTURE ADVANCE CLAUSES
In In re Conte,"10 a debtor borrowed money to purchase a car. The loan
documents contained a cross-collateralization and future advance clause
rule) was adopted in Texas in Tanenbaum v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769
(Tex. 1982) and has since been applied in numerous Texas cases. See, e.g., Milliorn v. Fi-
nance Plus, Inc., 973 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1998, no pet.) (failure to give notice
of public sale of collateral note barred recovery of deficiency, but creditor entitled to re-
cover on a separate note not involved in commercially unreasonable foreclosure sale);
Havins v. First Nat'l Bank, 919 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ) (sale of
collateral in a recognized market does not require prior notice, but record did not show
that livestock auction was a recognized market; absent proof of notice and commercially
reasonable disposition or that sale was in a recognized market, creditor not entitled to
recover deficiency); ITT Comm. Fin. Corp. v. Riehn, 796 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1990, no writ) (creditor who elects to sell collateral must both give notice and sell in com-
mercially reasonable manner to recover deficiency; failure to meet either requirement
makes sale an act of conversion).
One of the significant changes made by the revised Chapter 9 that became effective in
Texas on July 1, 2001 is the abolition of the absolute bar rule in commercial cases, thus
effectively repealing Tanenbaum and its progeny. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev.
§ 9.611(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000). Revised Chapter 9 adopts, instead, the "rebuttable pre-
sumption rule" under which the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable disposition
of collateral creates a presumption that the value of collateral equalled the amount of the
debt and puts the burden of proof on the secured party to show why the disposition did not
yield a sufficient return to pay the entire debt. Revised Chapter 9 takes no position on the
rule to be applied in consumer cases. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.611(c)
(Vernon Supp. 2000).
106. 21 S.W.3d 484 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. filed).
107. See id. at 488.
108. See id. at 488-89.
109. Id. at 489. The first paragraph of the dissenting opinion states:
In a strikingly bold stroke, the majority greatly expands the law of guaranty
to favor any poorly-worded attempt by a business entity to hold the em-
ployee or officer of a customer business personally liable for credit extended
to the company. After years of holding to the contrary, the law in Texas now
has suddenly swung from favoring the obligor, to favoring the obligee.
At this writing, a petition for review has been filed in Taylor-Made Hose and, given the
deep division in the Court of Appeals, a decision by the Texas Supreme Court may have
important implications for the Texas law of guaranties.
110. 206 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2000).
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providing that the car would serve not only as collateral for the car loan,
but also for any future loans that the creditor might make to the debtor.
The debtor subsequently applied for and received a credit card from the
creditor. The debtor eventually paid off the car loan and requested that
the creditor release the certificate of title to the vehicle. The creditor re-
fused because the debtor had an outstanding credit card balance in excess
of $7,000.00. In the debtor's ensuing bankruptcy proceeding, the court
held that the cross-collateralization and future advance clause was effec-
tive to continue a security interest in the car since the credit card ad-
vances were reasonably within the contemplation of the parties when the
loan agreement was made, as required by Texas law.11'
B. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCOUNT DEBTORS AND ASSIGNEES
A common financing pattern under Chapter 9 involves a three-party
transaction where a secured party provides the initial financing to a
debtor. The secured party then assigns its rights to a third party either by
sale of the security interest or by using the underlying security interest as
collateral for a loan from a third party. When such a transaction occurs,
the original debtor becomes an "account debtor" vis-a-vis the assignee
with respect to further payments on the account, chattel paper, or general
intangible that secured the original security interest. 1 2 In such transac-
tions, if the account debtor has a recoupment or setoff claim against the
original secured party, an issue arises as to whether the claim can be as-
serted against the assignee. Section 9.318 deals, at least in part, with
these situations.]3
In In re Alliance Health of Fort Worth, Inc.,114 the court held that until
actual notice of an assignment is received by the account debtor, the ac-
count debtor is entitled to set off any amounts owed to it by the as-
signor. 15 The court noted that filing a UCC financing statement is not
notice for purposes of section 9.318 and that the burden is on the assignor
to show that the account debtor received notice. 16 Because this showing
had not been made, setoff by the account debtor was allowed and was not
111. See id. at 538. The court noted that the Texas courts had interpreted TEX. Bus. &
CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.204(c) (Vernon 1991) to require that future advances be in the rea-
sonable contemplation of the parties when the agreement is made, citing Western Auto
Supply Co. v. Brazosport Bank of Texas, 840 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no writ). The Official Comment to revised TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.204
(Vernon Supp. 2000) notes that the revision liberalizes the rule as to future advances and
"rejects the holdings of cases decided under former Article 9 that applied other tests, such
as whether a future advance or other subsequently incurred obligation was of the same or a
similar type or class as earlier advances and obligation secured by the collateral." See
§ 9.204 cmt. 5.
112. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.105(a)(1) & 9.318 (Vernon 1991).
113. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.318 (Vernon 1991). The rules governing the
relationships between assignors, assignees, and account debtors have been expanded con-
siderably in revised Chapter 9. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.404 -.406 (Vernon
Supp. 2000).
114. 240 B.R. 699 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999).




affected by the account debtor's bankruptcy.' 17
C. PRIORITIES
The average person who kicks the tires on a used car lot on a Saturday
afternoon is more likely to be looking for body damage and mechanical
problems than thinking about certificates of title. A floor plan financer,
however, is more likely to be thinking about whether the car dealer will
turn over the proceeds resulting from any cars that are sold. For almost
any product other than cars, the financer probably has the bigger worry
because section 9.307 protects a buyer in the ordinary course of business
from the claims of an unpaid secured party.118 Under this rule, the fi-
nancer of inventory usually has to rely on the policing of collateral to be
sure that the seller is properly accounting for sale proceeds. In the case of
used cars, however, the financer has some extra protection in the form of
section 501.071(a) of the Texas Transportation Code. 119
In Bank One Texas, N.A. v. Arcadia Fin. Ltd., 20 a bank financed the
inventory of a used car dealer. As part of the arrangement, the bank filed
a financing statement as required by UCC section 9.302 to perfect its se-
curity interest.121 In addition, the bank followed the standard practice of
taking physical possession of the certificates of title on the used cars
pending sale and remission of the proceeds to the bank. 22 The car dealer
sold nine cars to various buyers and all these buyers financed their
purchases through a finance company. The buyers were given physical
possession of the cars, but none received a certificate of title at the time
of sale. If matters had gone as planned, the dealer would have paid the
sale proceeds to the bank and the bank would have released the titles to
the buyers. However (and this will no doubt be a shock to the sensibilities
of lawyers everywhere since, after all, if you can't trust a car dealer ...
the dealer did not remit the proceeds to the bank.
Faced with this lapse of etiquette, the bank refused to turn over the
certificates of title to the finance company and, instead, sued for a declar-
atory judgment that the bank had a prior perfected security interest in the
cars. The finance company counter-claimed for conversion and tortious
117. See id.
118. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.307 (Vernon 1991) provides, in part, that "a
buyer in [the] ordinary course of business... takes free of a security interest created by his
seller even though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its
existence." This rule has been carried forward in revised TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.320 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
119. TEX. TRANS. CODE ANN. § 501.071(a) (Vernon 1999) provides, "A motor vehicle
may not be the subject of a subsequent sale unless the owner designated in the certificate
of title transfers the certificate of title at the time of sale."
120. 219 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2000).
121. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.302 (Vernon 1991). The substance of this sec-
tion has been carried forward, with several changes, into revised Chapter 9 in TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.309 -.311 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
122. Although physical possession of a certificate of title does not perfect a security
interest in the vehicle, it does prevent the possible sale of the vehicle accompanied by a
transfer of the certificate of title by a dealer.
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interference with its contracts with the nine buyers. The court held that as
between the bank and the finance company, the sales were void because
the buyers did not qualify as buyers in the ordinary course of business
since they did not receive certificates of title at the time of sale.123 The
buyers, therefore, did not take free of the bank's security interest and the
claims of the finance company failed.124
In Conoco, Inc. v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank,125 the court of appeals held,
following remand from the Texas Supreme Court,126 that the claim of a
secured party for the conversion of proceeds by another creditor was
barred by the two year limitations period applicable to conversion ac-
tions. The court ruled that through the exercise of reasonable diligence,
the secured party could have ascertained the status of its security interest
in the proceeds more than two years before the action was brought.
Therefore, the discovery rule was not applicable to toll the running of the
limitations period. 127
In another proceeds case, 128 the debtors sold a number of cattle in
which a bank had a perfected security interest without accounting to the
bank for the proceeds. In the debtors' bankruptcy proceeding, the bank
successfully opposed the debtors' discharge to the extent of the proceeds
for which the debtors were unable to account.
D. SECURED PARTIES AND BANKRUPTCY
In In re Ti-Union Development Corp.,129 a corporation held properties
that were subject to over 1000 oil and gas leases. After the corporation
filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, it was discovered that 950 previ-
ously issued royalty checks had not yet been paid. In addition, as of the
date of filing the petition, the debtor had not yet processed payments for
a substantial amount of oil and gas production. The corporation sought
permission to pay the 950 outstanding checks and to complete the
processing of the other payments.
The court held that the royalty owners had perfected security interests
in productions and proceeds under section 9.319 of the Code.' 30 The cor-
poration, therefore, could pay the outstanding checks and process the re-
maining payments prior to confirmation of a reorganization plan in the
123. See Arcadia, 219 F.3d at 497.
124. See id.
125. 14 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.).
126. Conoco, Inc. v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 996 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1999).
127. See Conoco v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 14 S.W.3d at 328-29. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court applied the two-part test established by HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982
S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998). This test requires (1) that the injury must be inherently undis-
coverable, and (2) that the injury must be objectively verifiable.
128. See In re Grisham, 245 B.R. 65 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
129. 253 B.R. 808 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000).
130. See id. at 812. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.319 (Vernon 1991) is a non-
uniform Texas amendment to the Code creating an automatically perfected security inter-
est in favor of mineral interest royalty owners. The section has been carried over in virtu-
ally its original form as a non-uniform amendment to the revised Chapter 9. See TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 9.343 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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Chapter 11 proceeding. The court ruled that all of the proceeds of the oil
and gas production were cash collateral, and the cash could not be used
for any other purpose without a court order and without protection for
the royalty owners. 31
In In re Self,132 a debtor executed a promissory note in favor of a bank
to renew some earlier loans used to purchase a pickup truck and other
equipment used in the debtor's business. The debtor filed a voluntary pe-
tition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. 133 The bank
filed a motion for relief from automatic stay. 34 The debtor asserted that
the bank's interests were adequately protected because the vehicle was
insured, and it proposed to pay the bank's secured claim in full at the
contract rate of interest.
The court held that the creditor's interest in the collateral was ade-
quately protected and that no relief from the automatic stay was neces-
sary. 135 The court began its analysis by considering § 362(d)(2), which
provides that a creditor has the burden of proving: (1) the amount of its
claim; (2) that the claim was secured by a valid and perfected lien in the
property; and (3) that the debtor lacked equity in the property.136 The
court then determined that the burden shifted to the debtor to prove that
the property was necessary for an effective reorganization. 137 The court
held that the debtor met this burden by proving that the collateral was
necessary in the day-to-day operations of his business, which precluded
the court from granting relief under section 362(d)(2). 138
The bank also requested relief under section 362(d)(1). The court held
that the creditor had to prove that it had a valid and perfected lien on the
property, and that a decline in the value of the collateral was occurring or
131. See Tri-Union, 245 B.R. at 814. In its analysis, the court reasoned that under TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.319(q)(3) (Vernon 1991), a Texas royalty interest owner has a
security interest and can qualify as a first purchaser as defined in that section. According
to the court, this section applies whether the royalty is in kind or paid in cash. The term
"interest owner" is defined expansively under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.319(q)(2)
(Vernon 1991) and includes all royalty and working interest owners. To have a security
interest under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.319 (Vernon 1991) there must be written
evidence that the interest holder has a right under real estate law and the first purchaser
must voluntarily communicate to the interest owner an acknowledgment of his or her
rights. A first purchaser is one who acts "as an operator who received, on behalf of royalty
owners, production proceeds from third party purchasers." Prior to 1987, it is likely that
section 9.319 would only have applied to royalty interests that were collected in kind.
However, amendments in 1987 evidenced the legislature's intent to also protect those roy-
alty owners who received monetary payments. In some instances a bona fide purchaser
can cut off the claims of the interest holder. However, when the proceeds are either cash
or accounts the interests are perfected upon filing and are not cut off by a bona fide
purchaser.
132. 239 B.R. 877 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999).
133. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1330 (West 1997).
134. See Self, 239 B.R. at 878. The automatic stay comes into effect upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition under 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 1997). A motion to lift the stay is
permitted by 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d)(1) (West 1997).
135. See Self, 239 B.R. at 882.
136. See id. at 880.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 881 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)).
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was threatened because of the automatic stay. 139 If the creditor proved
this, the burden then shifted to the debtor to prove that the collateral was
not declining in value or that the creditor was adequately protected. 140
While the creditor did establish a prima facie case under section
362(d)(1), the court noted that the determination of whether a creditor's
interest is adequately protected is not an exact science. Instead, the court
stated that it was required to balance all of the relevant factors in the
case, including the value of the collateral, whether the collateral was
likely to depreciate over time, the debtor's prospects for a successful re-
organization and the debtor's performance under the plan. 141 The debtor
claimed that the bank's interest in the collateral was adequately protected
because he maintained proper insurance on the vehicle and was current
on his plan to repay the loan. Conversely, the bank claimed that the only
way it could be protected was by the entry of an order directing the
debtor to make interim payments to the bank in the pre-confirmation
period. The court determined that the imposition of direct protection
payments was not a proper remedy in a Chapter 13 context.' 42 Further-
more, there was no evidence that the debtor would not be able to fulfill
his financial obligations to the creditor in the future. Therefore, the court
determined that the bank's interest in the collateral was adequately pro-
tected and that no protective relief was warranted.143
E. ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTERESTS AFTER DEFAULT
In Al Gailani v. Riyad Bank Houston Agency, 144 the makers defaulted
on a note and the secured party foreclosed on the accounts receivable.
Following notice to the debtor and to the general public, the accounts
were sold at a public sale where the secured party purchased the accounts
for ten dollars and sued for a deficiency of $1,908,309.51. The secured
party moved for summary judgment against two of the co-makers and this
motion was granted by the trial court.
On appeal, the co-makers argued that the secured party had attempted
to collect from the account debtors by placing their names on a "black
list" maintained by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, thereby
preventing the account debtors from obtaining banking services in Saudi
Arabia. The co-makers further contended that the effect of this action
was to destroy any confidence a potential bidder might have in the ac-
count debtor's or co-makers' ability to repay the underlying loan. 145
The court held that the co-makers' first argument raised a fact issue as
to whether placing the account debtors' names on a "black list" was an
attempt to collect from the account debtors that would invoke the re-




143. See id. at 882.
144. 22 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, pet. filed).
145. See id. at 565.
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quirements of commercial reasonableness under section 9.502.146 The
court further held that the co-makers' second contention that the effect of
placing the names on a black list decreased the value of the accounts
raised a fact issue as to whether the secured party acted in a commercially
reasonable manner under section 9-502.147
Summary judgment in favor of the secured party was reversed and the
case was remanded for trial.148
In Fair Deal Auto Sales v. Brantley,149 a debtor purchased a car from a
dealer and made a down payment of $1700. The financing agreement
stated that the down payment due was $2100. The financing agreement
also listed two additional down payments of $250 each to be paid prior to
the first installment payment, which was due a week after the car was
purchased. The dealer told the debtor, contrary to the written agree-
ment, that this $500 was for payment of tax, title, and license fees and
could be paid with the first monthly car payment rather than within a
week. The debtor, therefore, believed that no payments were due before
the first monthly payment. About two weeks after the debtor purchased
the car, the dealer repossessed the vehicle, claiming that the debtor was
late on the first additional down payment of $250. The debtor sued the
dealer for wrongful repossession.
The court, quoting the trial judge's description of the transaction as a
"rip-off," held that the dealer wrongfully repossessed the car by misrepre-
senting the terms of the financing agreement. 150 The court stated that a
financing agreement must be consistent with what the creditor tells the
debtor and it must be signed, dated, and in writing. 151 In this case, since
the signatures on the financing agreement were not dated and because of
the inconsistency between the terms orally conveyed to the debtor and
those listed in the agreement, the dealer could not rely on the agreement
as justification for its actions.152 The court upheld an award of damages
against the dealer.153
146. See id. at 564-65 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.502 (Vernon 1991)).
147. See id. at 565.
148. See id. at 566.
149. 24 S.W.3d 543 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
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